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ABSTRACT
A new test of the compensating wage differential model is proposed. The
logic behind Roback's model showing howdifferences in nonproduced amenities
may bereflected in intercity wage differentials is extended to the case of
differences in local fiscal conditions, represented by tax rates and publicly
produced services. Results show that differences in local tax rates and
services provisions do generate compensating wage differentials across
cities. The effects of a particularly large set of taxes and effective
servicesoutput measures are examined.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Previous compensating wage differential studies have focused primarily on
worker and job characteristics. Implicitly these studies assume that
differences in the characteristics of the communities in which these jobs are
located are either nonexistent or are not relevant in the sense that they will
be capitalized into land prices. However, Roback (1980, 1982) demonstrated
that when both firms and workers compete for scarce land in a community,
differences in nonproduced goods, such as amenities, may be capitalized into
both land prices and wage rates. We will argue in the next section that
similar reasoning applies to differences across communities in the services
produced by local governments. This paper then empirically tests the
hypothesis that differences in local fiscal conditions measured by both
service levels and tax rates lead to compensating wage differentials.
We attempt to control for four basic local government services: police,
fire, health, and education. The violent crime rate is used as the control
for police services. Holding constant the local cost-of-living and the level
of taxation, our data indicate that a one percent increase in the incidence of
violent crime in a community is associated with a $780 compensating
differential in annual earnings. Fire services are controlled for by an
insurance rating index which takes values from one being the best to five
being the worst. A reduction in the quality of fire services provision in a
community as measured by a one category increase in the index is associated
with a $374 compensating differential in annual earnings. Health services
were proxied by the number of hospital beds per thousand capita. A unit
increase in this health measure was associated with a $57 drop in annual
earnings. We tested both input and output proxies for education services.
The input measure was the student to teacher ratio while the output measureJG—1 1
was a standardized test score ranking. The results from the wage equation
estimation showed wages rose with increasing levels of educational input
(lower student—to—teacher ratio). This is opposite to the predicted effect.
The impact on the educational output measure was insignificantly different
from zero. We also estimated the model using the more traditional expenditure
measures for services output used in much of the Tiebout literature on land
value capitalization in the urban economics field. The impacts of the
expenditure variables on earnings were either the wrong sign or were too large
in magnitude to be believed. This underscores the importance of employing
output or, at the least, nonexpenditure input measures for services provision.
We also investigated whether a variety of state or local sales, income,
and property tax differentials lead to compensating wage differentials.
Holding constant the cost-of-living and level of services in a community,
raising the level of sales or property taxation resulted in a reduction in
wages. An increase in the effective property tax rate by one percentage point
(from its mean of 2% to 3%) led to a $350 drop in annual earnings.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper
presents the basic argument extending Roback's model to government services.
The third section gives the details on the construction of the variables used
in the analysis as well as the selection criteria used to generate the sample
of workers. The fourth section discusses the specific hypotheses to be tested
and presents the empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in the fifth
section.
II. RATIONALE FOR INCORPORATING LOCAL FISCAL CONDITIONS IN WAGE EQUATION
One of the cornerstones of modern labor economic theory is the
compensating wage difference model. A major research program since Rosen's
(197L) explication of the model has been to empirically verify its
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implications. Early work concentrated on estimating wage differentials
associated with hazardous jobs.1 Wages were found to increase significantly
with the mortality risk of a job. Subsequent studies tended to focus on other
types of job characteristics such as the physical effort required, the working
conditions, flexibility of hours, access to job training, and layoff risk.2
While some of the findings were consistent with the theory, overall the
results were not encouraging.
Left out variable bias and measurement error were felt to be the two
principal reasons for the poor performance of these tests. Brown (1980)
surveyed the literature and presented a test using longitudinal as opposed to
cross sectional data. This allowed him to difference out the effects of left
out variables that remained constant through time.3 He found that many of the
job characteristics still had either wrong signs or insignificant
coefficients. More recently, Duncan and Hoimlund (1983) also attempted to
reduce the problem of measurement error in job characteristics by using both
panel data and self reported ob characteristics. This allows them to look at
the effect of changes in wages on changes in self reported job
characteristics. They found that the estimates based on the panel data
dominated those based on a single cross section. However, constrained hours
and hard physical work still produced inconsistent wage effects.
While there is certainly merit to further refinements of the tests of
wage effects arising from job characteristics, we will argue in this paper
that there exists a set of characteristics which has largely been ignored in
this literature and which provides an additional test of the equalizing
differences model. Workers who live and work in the same community "consume"
not only the nonpecuniary characteristics of their job but also the
characteristics of the community in which that job is located. However,JG—1 1
apart from variables indicating local labor market demand conditions,
community characteristics usually have been left out of wage equations.5
There are two possible defenses for not controlling for community
characteristics. The first is that either there are few differences across
communities in their basic characteristics or that these differences are
unimportant to a worker's utility. We will demonstrate later in the paper
that this is unlikely to be a reasonable justification since fiscal conditions
vary widely across communities. Secondly, if the differences that do exist
become fully capitalized in the price of the fixed factor, land, then there
may be no reason for wages to also adjust.6 If that is the case, no harm is
done by leaving out community traits in wage studies. Roback (1980, 1982)
argued that land prices alone will not generally fully reflect differences
across communities in the level of nonproduced "amenities" or
"disamenities." If her argument can be extended to produced goods such as
government services, then there is a compelling reason to include local fiscal
conditions in wage studies and to test for their role in generating
compensating wage differentials.
Roback's basic argument concerning amenities can be briefly outlined.
Consider a competitive labor market and set of product markets where both
workers and firms are mobile. In this setting, there exists a market
determined level of utility and profitability that the marginal worker and
firm must receive. In addition, assume that workers live and work in the same
community. If land in the community i$ scarce, its price will be determined
jointly by the demand for land by both workers and firms. Now allow
communities to vary in terms of their levels of amenities. By definition,
these nonproduced goods are not rationed by explicit prices. Instead,
implicit prices are determined by adjustments in land prices and wage rates.
_L.JG—1 1
Consider first the case of a "nonproductive" amenity which increases
worker utility but has no impact on firm profitability. Some communities have
higher levels of this amenity than others. This amenity can be rationed among
workers through increas-ing land prices and/or lowering wage rates in the
relatively high amenity localities. Suppose the utility gain conferred by
this amenity is fully capitalized into land prices. This leaves the marginal
worker indifferent between working in the community with a certain amount of
the amenity or in an alternative community. However, the marginal firm would
now relocate in a community without the amenity since the higher land prices
in the high amenity communities would reduce their profitability below the
market determined level. Consequently, equilibrium will require that land
prices increase and wage rates decrease in such a way that both marginal
workers and firms have no incentive to relocate. The second case to consider
is that of a "productive" amenity, a community characteristic that raises both
the firm's profitability and the worker's utility, all else constant. As
before, the amenity can be rationed among workers by increases in land prices
and/or reductions in the wage rate. Rationing the amenity among firms
requires increases in land prices and/or increases in the wage rate.
Consequently, equilibrium Land prices in the community with the amenity will
be higher while the wage effect is indeterminate.
Turn now to the case of produced government services. The key difference
between government services and amenities is that explicit prices in the form
of taxes exist for these services. However, one can still use Roback's
methodology to determine the impact of a change in the level of service
provision holding constant taxes (or of the converse). For example, consider
the impact from an increase in the quality of some service (safety, for
example) in a community holding constant the level of local taxation.7 The
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effects on both workers and firms are again important. A worker's utility is
obviously increased from an increased service level with no increased tax
price. Again, higher land prices and/or lower wages are required to ration
workers. The impact on factor prices from the firm side is not so clear in
this case. The preponderance of evidence and opinion is that local services
do not bring substantial benefits to firms.8 The effect almost certainly is
of second-order importance relative to that on worker-residents. If firms do
not value added local services (or do so only marginally), the overall impact
of the service level change on factor prices likely will be the same as in the
case of the nonproductive amenity--lower wages and higher land prices.
However, if firms really value the produced local service, the wage effect
becomes ambiguous. This is because higher wages and/or higher rents would
serve to ration firms while lower wages and/or higher rents would ration
workers. Empirical results presented below are broadly consistent with the
hypothesis that firms receive little or no benefits from added local services.
In a similar fashion, increases in a tax that is paid by both workers and
firms, such as the property tax, holding constant the worker's cost-of-living
may cause wages to fall and have an indeterminate effect of land prices.
Since the tax increase to the worker is being offset in his/her budget so as
to maintain his cost-of-living, the worker will either benefit from or be
indifferent to the tax increase depending upon whether the worker perceives
that the additional revenues generated from the tax increase will go toward
services that he/she values. In the event that the worker values the
additional services, then wages would have to fall and/or land prices rise to
ration workers amongcommunities.Whenthetax bill necessary to pay for any
added local services is considered, it is very difficult to argue that firms
reap net benefits from the situation.9 Rationing firms amongcommunities inJG-1 1
this situation requires that wages fall and/or land prices fall.Consequently,
downward pressure is placed on wages.
The potential importance of controlling for local fiscal conditions is
evidenced by the wide spread in both tax rates and service measuresacross
cities. For example, effective property tax rates were as low as 0.54% in New
Orleans and as high as 4.95% in Boston. Violent crimesper 100 capita ranged
from 0.38 in San Jose to 3.13 in Newark. Hospital bedsper 1,000 capita go
from a high of 25.61 in Pittsburgh to a low of' 3.25 in San Jose. Asa final
illustration, student to teacher ratios differed by as much as 5.5 points
between Pittsburgh and San Francisco. The diversity in these fiscal variables
across cities implies that the potential is there for wages to play a
significant role as an equalizing factor.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA SET
We test the hypothesis that varying local fiscal conditionsgenerate
compensating wage differentials by estimating an expanded wage specification
on workers selected from the Kay 1977 CPS data. The general form of thewage
regression augmented with the vector of fiscal characteristics which was
estimated is given by
Industry Personal State/Local




a log Index +e
where the a's are coefficients or coefficient vectors and e is theerror term
with the standard properties.
Before estimating (1), the first task was to select a sample of' workers
which conformed to the basic model discussed in the previous section. We
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required that the individual's major activity last week was working or with a
job but not working, that they be full time labor market participants or part
time for economic reasons, and that they live and work in a central city. One
reason for the last restriction is that the tax and service data pertain to
the central cities only and not to their surrounding suburbs. In addition, it
is important to look at people who not only work in the central city but also
live there since this implies that as a resident they "consume" the services
provided in the city)0 Wage rates were imputed for all workers using their
reported usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours.
The sample was further limited to nonunion private sector workers. This
was done for a variety of reasons. Particularly as unionism has come to the
public sector, it has become more evident that public sector pay and
employment decisions can be influenced via the political process.11 Inman
(1981) and others have attempted to model the public sector (union and
nonunion) bargaining process. With public sector wages being determined via a
budgetary and political process involving the level of state—local taxation,
tax rates and levels of services provisions cannot be considered exogenous
determinants of public sector wages. Consequently, Rosen's (19714)
compensating differential story with respect to the tax—service package does
not apply to public sector workers.12
Private sector workers who are members of labor unions were also removed
from the sample for two basic reasons. First, their wages are determined
through a bargaining process which is quite distinct from the competitive
labor market described in the previous section. Secondly, that model also
assumed that workers were mobile and consequently arbitrage away any
advantages that may develop in some cities. This mobility is unlikely to
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exist to a great degree for union workers due to the presence of union wage
premiums. 13
A total of 1414 cities are listed in the CPS data. Tax data existed for 31
of these cities. Central to the test of our hypotheses is the ability to
offset a tax change by holding constant the worker's cost-of-living. However,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports direct metropolitan budget data
for only 20 of the cities listed in the CPS data. To take advantage of the
full range of variation in fiscal variables, we chose to include all 31 cities
for which tax data exists and to impute a cost-of—living index when a direct
measure was unavailable. The BLS metropolitan budget figures were regressed
on three region dummy variables and city population. These variables
explained over 50% of the variation in the budget data.114 This regression was
used to impute values for the cost-of-living index when a direct BLS figure
was unavailable.
The fiscal variables which were merged into the sample consisted of a
varietyof tax rates and service measures. Effective property and sales tax
rates were used instead of statutory rates. For property taxes, the effective
rateequals the statutory tax rate multiplied by the local assessment to
market value ratio. The limited availability of these ratios was the primary
restriction on the number of cities for which tax data could be collected.
The statutory rate is for 1976 since 1977 figures are not available. The
assessment-sales ratios and property tax rates are from Volume II of the
Census of Governments for the year 1976. Effective sales tax rates were
calculated by taking the actual state or local sales tax rate and multiplying
it by the "comprehensiveness" measure reported by Feenberg and Rosen (1986).
This measure reflects the degree to which categories of sales items in a state
are excluded from sales taxes. State sales tax rates for 1977 were taken from
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the 1978 issue of Facts and Figures on Government Finances published by the
Tax Foundation. City sales tax rates were collected from various issues of
the Commerce Clearing House publication State Tax Reporter. State and local
income tax rates were also included in the sample. The local income tax
almost universally consisted of a flat tax rate. The state income tax data
consisted of a mixture of flat and progressive rate schedules. For
progressive rate states, the highest bracket often began at a low to moderate
income level. In those cases, we used the highest bracket as the statutory
rate for every individual from that state. For a few states such as Louisiana
and Ohio the highest bracket did not begin until incomes reached levels of
$100,000 and $140,000 respectively. In these cases, the statutory rate was
selected to be the marginal rate which applied to the median income level for
individuals from that state. State and local income tax data was collected
from Facts and Figures on Government Finances.
The last set of variables to consider are the measures of government
services. We attempt to control for police, fire, health, and educational
services. The standard approach in the Tiebout literature has been to use per
capita expenditures data by service category.15 While it is questionable if
expenditures measures adequately proxy for service levels across relatively
homogeneous suburbs within a single SMSA, it is very doubtful that they are
good proxies for service variation across central cities in different SMSAs.
For police services, we use the per capita incidence of violent crimes.16
Health services are proxied by the number of hospital beds per thousand
capita. Both the violent crime and the number of hospital beds are taken from
the 1976-77 issue of County and City Data Book and pertain to 1975. The
measure used for fire services is a rating scheme developed by insurance
companies for setting premiums in a city. The original rating was from zero
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to one hundred. However, the data are only published in interval form with
the first interval indicating the top 20% and the fifth interval the bottom
20%. These intervals are reported in The Municipal Year Book 1976.
The last service controlled for is education. A standard input measure
used to rate city services is the student to teacher ratio. These numbers are
published every ten years in the Digest of Education Statistics. Relative
rankings of cities changed very little over the 1971-1981 period. The 1981
data is used as the first proxy for education services. Since both
educational expenditures and the student to teacher ratios are measures of
educational input, an attempt was made to construct an alternative output
measure. The natural choice is a standardized test score measure but such
measures are not readily available.17 Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores
by city are one possibility. However, these tests are taken only by students
who are applying to college. The fraction of graduating seniors who take the
SAT test varies widely by state and city. Consequently we chose instead to
collect reading scores on standardized tests for elementary school students
for the school districts represented in our sample of cities.18 For sake of
comparison, the results for both the student to teacher ratio as well as the
test score variables are reported. 19
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The general specification in (1) was run on a sample of 2508 private
sector workers. Summary statistics on all variables used are reported in
Table 1. Results from three different specifications of (1) are presented in
Table 2.
The coefficients on service variables where an increase in the variable
corresponds to more (less) of that service being provided in the community
should be negative (positive). As the service level is increased holding
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constant both the worker's cost—of-living and tax burden, he/she is made
better off.In equilibrium, wages will fall in order to help ration workers
among communities. Since the value firms place on local services probably is
of second-order importance, the negative impact on wages should not be
significantly altered by the presence of firms also competing for scarce
land. The results in Table 2 are generally consistent with this conclusion.
The coefficient we expected on a tax variable depends on the type of tax
which is being varied.It is important at this point to reiterate that we
have eliminated the influence of income taxes from the cost-of-living index by
removing the income and social security taxesfrom the budget data used to
compute the index.20 However, state and local sales taxes as well as property
taxes are reflected in the index through their effect on consumption and
housing costs. As a result, holding constant the cost—of—living variable will
offset increases in sales and property taxes through reductions in other
prices in the community but will not offset increases in income tax changes.
Consequently, the coefficients on the sales and property tax rates should be
negative or insignificantly different from zero. Increasing one of these
taxes and offsetting the additional tax burden in the worker's budget leaves
the worker no worse off than before. If the additional tax revenues generated
from the tax increase go to provide services which he/she values and which
have not been controlled for (or controlled for imperfectly with the service
variables), then the worker is better off and competition will bid down
wages. If the worker does not value the additional services or if the tax
revenues are diverted by the local government officials away from services,
then wages need not change. Since firms are not likely to highly value any
added services produced from the higher taxes, wages and/or land rents must
fall to restore profitability so that the overall effect on wages is downward.
-12—JG-1 1
In contrast, positive coefficients on the two income tax variables are
expected. If the increased income tax revenues are used to provide services
of equal value to the worker, then the reasoning above suggests that net wages
would remain constant. Wage data reported in the CPS are intended to be gross
wages. Equations (2) and (3) help derive the income tax coefficient which
implies that net wages are unchanged. Let Wg represent the gross wage rate
and the net of local income tax wage rate. If the local income tax






Taking the log derivative of this expression and setting dlnWn0 yields
dlnW___ 1
(3) dr 100—r
If the local tax rate is (say) 1% (about the average for cities with nonzero
income tax rates), then from the expressions above, LnWg must increase by
0.0101 in response to a 1% increase in r to keep net wages constant. If the
tax schedule is progressive as it is for some state income taxes, then a
positive coefficient less than 0.01 could still imply that net wages have
remained unchanged. This follows from the fact that with progressive
taxation, marginal tax rates exceed average tax rates so that a 1% increase in
the marginal rate implies less than a 1% increase in the worker's tax bill.
The predicted effects of the job and worker traits have been well
discussed in the literature. The coefficients on the worker's personal
characteristics reported in Table 2 are quite similar to findings in previous
studies. The population growth in the city from 1970 to 1980 was included as
a proxy for local labor market conditions. While population growth can signal
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either rightward shifts in the labor demand or the labor supply (or both)
curves, the positive and significant coefficient is consistent with a demand
side story. The last nonfiscal variable to consider is the log of the cost-
of-living index. Most studies deflate the nominal wage by the cost of living
index and then use the log real wage as the left hand side variable. The
implied restriction is that the coefficient of the log cost—of-living equals
one. This restriction can not be rejected in ourdata.21
Turn now to the fiscal variables.22 In each of the two specifications
using nonexpenditure measures for services reported in columns 1 and 2, the
coefficients on the sales and property taxes are negative and significant in
the case of the property tax.23 Using the first specification, a one
percentage point increase in the effective property tax leads to a $350
reduction in annual earnings.21 The coefficients on the state and local
income taxes are positive. In each case, the null that net wages have
remained constant is not rejected. The proxy for police services has a
positive and significant coefficient. Increasing the incidence of violent
crime in a community by 1% is associated with a $780 compensating increase in
annual earnings. Similarly, the proxy for fire services also has a positive
and significant coefficient. Reducing the level of fire services sufficiently
to move a city up one interval in its fire rating is associated with a $295
compensating increase in annual earnings. The coefficient on hospital beds
was negative and significant. A unit increase in this variable is associated
with a $57 reduction in annual earnings.
While the health figure seems small in comparison, its magnitude is
affected by its unit of measurement. The relative importance of these three
service measures can be better seen by considering the effect on annual
earnings arising from a standard deviation change in each variable, The
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corresponding effects for crime, fire, and health are $3714, $1405, and $21414
respectively.
Since higher student to teacher ratios allegedly correspond to fewer
educational services while higher test scores correspond to greater
educational services, the student to teacher ratio coefficient was expected to
be positive and the coefficient on the test score was expected to be
negative. In fact, the coefficient on the student to teacher ratio was
negative and significant at the 10% level while the test score coefficient was
insignificantly different from zero. One possibility is that there is
significant measurement error in each variable which is biasing the
coefficients. an alternative explanation is that unlike police and fire
services, not all individuals may value the educational services provided in
the community. We reestimated the wage equations for the subsample of'
individuals who had completed at least one year of schooling beyond high
school. If more educated people in fact place a higher value on the quality
of education in the community, then we would expect to see the coefficient on
test scores in this sample of workers to be greater in absolute value.In
fact, the coefficient on the test score was over seven times as large in
absolute value (-0.0022) as in the overall sample. The t-statistic increased
from 0.00 in absolute value to 1.23.25
Finally, specification three reports the results from using the
expenditure measures for services. In each case, a negative coefficient was
expected. In fact, only the coefficient on fire expenditures is negative and
significant. The magnitude of this coefficient, however, is much too large to
be plausible. Based on the coefficient estimate, an additional $100 per
capita in fire expenditure is associated with a $1.90 reduction in the wage
rate which corresponds to a $3,800 reduction in annual earnings. Also note
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that the coefficient on police expenditures is not only the wrong sign but
also significant. These results underscore our concern with using expenditure
measures and emphasize that they can be poor or even perverse proxies for
actual service levels especially in comparisons across larger cities.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated the question of' whether wages tend to
equalize differences across cities due to variation in the level of taxation
and the provision of basic services. The data indicated that wages do adjust
in a consistent manner for each service category except for education. Tax
differentials also give rise to offsetting wage differentials. Overall, the
view that a worker's utility is affected not only by the characteristics of
the job but also by the characteristics of the city in which that job is
located seems reasonable in light of the findings.
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Footnotes
1See Thaler and Rosen (1975) and Smith (1973).
2Effort and working conditions are investigated by Lucas (1977) and
Harnermesfl (1977). Flexibility of hours and work schedules are investigated by
Duncan (1976) and Duncan and Stafford (1977). Layoff risk is investigated by
Abowd & Ashenfelter (1981).
3Brown assigns to each worker theaverage job characteristic for his/her
occupation classification.
Job and community characteristics can in part be "unbundled"by living
and working in different areas. To avoid these situations in our analysis, we
attempt to focus on individuals who both live and work in a central city.
Further details on the construction of the sample will be given later in the
paper.
5Two noteable exceptions are Rosen (1979) and Roback (1980, 1982).
6There is a long list of empirical studies in the urban literature
beginning with Oates (1969) which investigate the degree to which land prices
do vary with community fiscal conditions.
71t would be possible to perform this type of comparative static exercise
in the data if local governments differ in their efficiency at producing
services. In addition, we need to assume that the governments set taxes so as
to cover unit costs of' the services. See Gyourko & Tracy (1986a) for a
discussion of' the consequences of local governments attempting to capture
rents arising from efficiency advantages.
8This is a widely—held view in the urban economics and local public
finance literatures. The interested reader should see any of the reviews by
Newman and Sullivan (1986), Oakland (1978), or Wasylenko (1980) for more on
this. Additionally, evidence from the business location literature indicates
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that differences in local public services provision have no influence on the
location of business activity, all else constant. A series of studies by
Schmenner (1973, 1978, 1982) is a good representative of this work.
9See the discussion and citations in footnote 8 for why this viewpoint is
widely held by most urban and local public finance economists.
10The CPS data identifies individual workers by place of residence. Most
central city residents who work do so in the central city. Most suburbanites
probably do not work in the jurisdiction where they live. Consequently, our
sample is restricted to those who live in the central city.
See Freeman's (1986) recent review article and the earlier work by
Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1983).
2See Gyourko and Tracy (1986b) for an analysis of the relationship
between local public sector wages and levels of state and local taxation.
13We carried out the same analysis on the union workers as we did for the
nonunion workers. As expected, none of the government service measures
significantly affected their wage rates. The specific regression results are
available upon request.
ll4The specific regression result is as follows:
CLI0.9L3 +0.012*Population+0.O46*JE÷0.009*West-0.035*South
(0.015) (0.036) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
R2O.5L9 MSE0.0018
The CLI is a cost-of-living index calculated from the BLS metropolitan
budget data where all income tax and social security tax components have been
deleted. Population is measured in millions. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. We also experimented with imputing cost—of-living index values
by using a reported value from a nearby city in the region. We do not report
results from specifications using this imputation method but they do not
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differ significantly from those reported in Table 2. The results are
available upon request.
15An exception is Rosen and Fullerton (1979). They use school test
scores in lieu of education expenditures. Since empirical studies of' the
Tiebout hypothesis examine land price variation across relatively homogenous
locations within an SMSf, it is less surprising that more effort has not gone
into developing alternatives to the expenditure variables.
16We experimented with both violent andproperty crime rates and found no
significant wage effects associated with changes in property crime holding
constant violent crime. Consequently, property crime was dropped from the
specification.
l7ii test score data will still have the problem of confounding the
quality of the educational services provided with the ability of the students
attending these schools.
18We were unable to obtain test score data from Newark and Portland.
19These data were collected via letter and phone conversations with the
individual school districts. It is important to note that the test score data
we collected is also not consistent across all cities in our sample. First,
not all cities give the same standardized exam. However, a relatively poor
performance and ranking on the reading comprehension section of the California
Aptitude Test is likely to be (fairly closely) duplicated on the Comprehensive
Test of Basic Skills. Second, not all scores are for sixth graders although
our data covers only elementary students in the fourth through sixth grade.
Six cities had data only on fourth or fifth graders. Third, while most scores
are from tests administered during the 1977 academic year, others are from as
early as 1976 and as late as 1981. Fourth, not all districts report the
percentage of their students at or above the national average on the test.
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Conversions had to be made. There was virtually always enough information
(e.g., detailed stanine scores) to do this successfully although the
underlying data were varied. Fifth and most importantly, some school
districts did not administer the exam to a random sample of students. In a
few districts, school principals were allowed to pick the students taking the
exam. The incentives for choosing the brighter students are obvious. In some
cases, we simply were not able to ascertain how the students taking the exam
were selected.
20See footnote 114. We eliminated the social security and income tax
components of the budget when calculating the CLI because much of their
variation arises from differences in wages and not from intrinsic cost-of-
living differences across communities.
21The coefficient reported in table 2 reflects the wage compensation
resulting from nontax variation in the cost-of-living. If we delete the sales
and property taxes from the specification, then the coefficient on the cost-
of-living falls significantly below one. This finding is consistent with the
view that local taxes act as prices for local services. That is, variation in
taxes need not necessarily be compensated by variation in wages if services
provision vary accordingly.
22We also tried estimating the model with controls for amenities such as
pollution and weather. A particulate matter measure was used as the pollution
variable. It consistently had the wrong sign (negative) and was
significant. The number of clear days also had a wrong sign (positive) and
was significant. Several other weather variables including number of rainy
days, annual snowfall, etc. were also tested. The high collinearity among
these variables made it impossible to obtain sensible results. Consequently,
-20-JG—1 1
we opted to delete the amenity variables from all of the specifications which
we report in this paper.
23Recall that we expected the nonincome tax coefficients to be negative
in part because any increase in the tax burden was being offset by other price
reductions in order to maintain the worker's cost-of—living. As a test of
this, we estimated the model leaving out the cost-of-living variable and the
service measures. In this case, the local sales and property tax coefficients
were each insignificantly different from zero. The state sales tax
coefficient becomes positive and is significant at the 10% level.
214This figure and those to follow are calculated using the meanwage in
the sample and an assumption of 2,000 annual hours worked.
251n addition, the implied compensating wage differentials for police,
fire, and health services increased dramatically. A unit increase in violent
crimes is associated with a $1,360 increase in annual earnings. A unit
increase in the fire rating is now associated with approximately a $660
increase in annual earnings. Finally, a unit increase in the health measure
now results in a reduction in annual earnings of $133.
—21—JG—1 1
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214TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES




Married (0—1 dummy;1 ifmarried)
White (0-1 dummy;1 ifwhite)
Male (0-1 dummy; 1 if male)
Veteran (0—1 dummy; 1 if veteran)
Blue Collar (0—1 dummy; 1 if blue
Population growth (%)
LogCost-Of-Living Index
Effective Property Tax Rate (%)
EffectiveState Sales Tax Rate (%)
NominalState Sales Tax Rate (%)
EffectiveLocal Sales Tax Rate (%)
NominalLocal Sales Tax Rate (%)
StateIncome Tax Rate (%)
LocalIncome Tax Rate (%)
ViolentCrime (#1100 capita)
Fire Rating
Hospital Beds (#11000 capita)


























































EFFECT OF LOCAL FISCAL VARIABLES ON WAGE RATES












































































































































State Sales Tax Rate
Local Sales Tax Rate
State Income Tax Rate











Note: Thirty—two industry dummy variables are controlled for in each
specification. Standard errors are in the parentheses.